Modern organisations rely on more than employee accounts to keep their applications connected and operational. Service accounts, automated bots, API tokens, and application integrations perform routine tasks such as synchronising information, triggering workflows, transferring data, and supporting software development processes. Although these identities improve efficiency, they can also introduce security risks when their access is not properly monitored.
Unlike employee accounts, non-human identities may operate continuously without direct supervision. Their permissions can remain active long after an integration is discontinued or the original business requirement changes. If these accounts hold excessive privileges, attackers may exploit them to access sensitive information or perform unauthorised actions.
A structured access governance programme should therefore include non-human identities as part of regular access reviews.
Understanding the Security Risks of Non-Human Identities
Non-human identities are created to support automated processes and communication between applications. They may be configured to access databases, retrieve documents, execute scripts, or exchange information between systems.
The challenge is that these accounts are often established for a specific technical requirement and then left unchanged. Over time, their permissions may become broader than necessary. Some accounts may also have unclear ownership, making it difficult to determine whether they are still required.
Common risks include:
- Unused service accounts retaining active permissions.
- API tokens remaining valid after an integration is retired.
- Automated accounts having administrator-level privileges unnecessarily.
- Shared credentials making accountability difficult.
- Technical accounts operating without periodic security checks.
These weaknesses can create persistent access paths that are difficult to detect through employee-focused access reviews alone.
Why Service Accounts Need Regular Access Reviews
Every non-human identity should have a defined purpose, an accountable owner, and an appropriate level of access. Regular reviews help organisations confirm that these requirements remain valid.
For example, an automated account may initially need access to a particular project or repository. If its responsibilities change, its permissions should be reassessed rather than automatically retaining its original access.
A structured User Access Review For Bitbucket can help organisations examine permissions associated with automated development workflows, repository integrations, and technical accounts. Reviewers can assess whether each identity still requires access and whether its assigned privileges are appropriate.
Similarly, organisations using project collaboration platforms should include service accounts and integrations in their broader User Access Review For Jira process. This helps ensure that automated workflows do not retain unnecessary permissions across projects and related resources.
The objective is not simply to identify active accounts. It is to establish whether every identity has a legitimate business or technical purpose.
Establishing Ownership and Accountability
One of the biggest challenges in managing non-human identities is identifying who is responsible for them. An employee account normally has a direct relationship with an individual, but a service account may be created by a developer, infrastructure team, or application administrator.
If the original creator leaves the organisation or changes roles, the account may continue operating without clear ownership.
Organisations can reduce this risk by maintaining an inventory containing:
- The service account or integration name.
- The application or system it accesses.
- Its business or technical purpose.
- The responsible owner or team.
- The permissions assigned to it.
- The date of its last review.
- Its current operational status.
Ownership should be reassigned whenever the responsible team changes. Accounts without identifiable owners should be investigated and either assigned to an appropriate team or disabled after confirming that they are no longer required.
This creates a clearer accountability structure and makes review decisions easier to validate.
Applying the Principle of Least Privilege
Non-human identities should receive only the permissions required to perform their assigned functions. Granting broad access for convenience can increase the potential impact of a compromised credential.
For instance, an integration that only needs to read information should not automatically receive permission to modify or delete it. Similarly, an automated process supporting one development project should not have unrestricted access to unrelated repositories.
Organisations should periodically compare assigned permissions with actual operational requirements. Where excessive privileges are identified, they should be reduced through a controlled remediation process.
Additional safeguards can include using dedicated credentials, restricting token permissions, rotating secrets, and monitoring unusual account activity. These controls complement access reviews by reducing the opportunities for credentials to be misused.
Integrating Non-Human Identities into Governance Workflows
Managing service accounts separately from employee access can create fragmented oversight. A more effective approach is to incorporate them into the organisation’s wider identity governance framework.
A consistent review process should identify all relevant identity types, assign accountable reviewers, validate business requirements, and record the decisions made. It should also provide a clear process for escalating accounts with missing owners, excessive permissions, or uncertain purposes.
Automation can make this process more manageable, particularly in organisations with numerous applications and integrations. Centralised governance capabilities can help security teams organise review activities, monitor outstanding decisions, and maintain evidence of completed reviews.
SecurEnds supports user access review processes that help organisations strengthen visibility and accountability over application access. By including non-human identities in the governance process, organisations can extend oversight beyond employee accounts and address risks associated with automated access.
Conclusion
Service accounts and automated identities are essential to modern business operations, but their access should never be treated as automatically trustworthy. Unused credentials, excessive permissions, and unclear ownership can create security gaps that remain unnoticed for extended periods.
Regular access reviews, clear ownership, least-privilege permissions, and consistent monitoring help organisations maintain control over these identities. Incorporating non-human accounts into a broader access governance programme makes it easier to identify unnecessary access, improve accountability, and reduce the risk of unauthorised activity across business applications.
